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ABSTRACT 
Most elections, both for the composition of a legislative body (a Parliament, say, or a city council) and for a 
single legislator (such as a president or mayor) are contested across a territory that comprises a number of に if 
not a myriad に separate places. Overviews of election results often treat the territory as a homogeneous unit に 
relationships between voter characteristics and choices are assumed to be invariant across all of the places. 
Much research has shown that this is rarely the case, however, and that there are significant differences 
between places in voter behaviour. Such differences are often grouped together as neighbourhood effects, 
and their cause associated with the flow of information through local social networks. This chapter reviews 
that literature, focusing not only on the role of conversation in the formation of political attitudes and voter 
behaviour in contests between parties but also on: voting for particular candidates に friends and neighbours 
effects; voting on the basis of local rather than wider matters に local issues; and voting patterns influenced by 





Local Context, Social Networks and  
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Most elections, both for the composition of a legislative body (a Parliament, say, or a city council) 
and for a single legislator (such as a president or mayor) are contested across a territory that 
comprises a number of に if not a myriad に separate places. Overviews of election results often treat 
that territory as a homogeneous unit に relationships between voter characteristics and choices are 
assumed to be invariant across all of its constituent places. Much research has shown that this is 
rarely the case, however, and that there are significant differences between places in voter 
behaviour. Such differences are often grouped together as neighbourhood effects, and their cause 
associated with the flow of information through local social networks.  
 
Much media and other commentary on voter behaviour, and some academic studies, therefore 
(implicitly at least) treats members of the electorate as isolated atoms who make decisions on 
whether to vote and who or what to vote for without any reference to the places where they live 
and the people they interact with there. Many treat them as members of some idealised concept に 
such as a social class に H┌デ a;ｷﾉ デﾗ ヴWIﾗｪﾐｷゲW デｴ;デ ﾐﾗﾐW ﾗa デｴﾗゲW IﾗﾐIWヮデゲ ;ヴW けﾐ;デ┌ヴ;ﾉげき デｴW┞ ;ヴW ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ 
constructions and if people are both assigned to a group and accept its membership, they then have 
to learn what that membership involves and how they are expected to behave. Such learning に like 
all other forms of learning に involves interactions with others and, despite the growing importance 
of the internet and electronic communications, most of those interactions occur in places: they 
literally take place に we do not yet live in placeless worlds. 
 
Recognition of the important fact that, hHowever important membership of particular groups に age, 
gender, ethnicity, social class etc. に are in the structuring of society and as influences on patterns of 
behaviour, therefore, place matters as a behavioural context has been exemplified in a wide range 
of studies of public opinion and voting behaviour. This chapter reviews that literature;., focusing not 
only on the role of conversation in the formation of political attitudes and voter behaviour in 
contests between parties but also on: voting for particular candidates に friends and neighbours 
effects; voting on the basis of local rather than wider matters に local issues; and voting patterns 
influenced by campaigns that vary locally in their intensity. iIts main sections illustrate three 
separate に though in most cases inter-linked に place-based vote-winning strategies: inter-personal 
interactions in local contexts; local environmental effects; and organisational effects. 
 
Neighbours and networks: the neighbourhood effect 
 
A very substantial component of the literature on voting patterns and local contexts concerns what 
has become known very widely に much more widely than in studies of voting behaviour alone に as 
the neighbourhood effect. The classic work was by Tingsten (1937), who noted that working-class 
support for the Swedish socialist party increased the more working-class the voting precinct in which 
class members lived. The implication ┘;ゲ デｴ;デ ヮWﾗヮﾉWげゲ ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ ﾗヮｷﾐｷﾗﾐゲ ;ヴW ｷﾐaﾉ┌WﾐIWS H┞ デｴWｷヴ 
ﾐWｷｪｴHﾗ┌ヴゲげが ゲﾗ デｴ;デ, for example, the more socialist party supporters individuals encountered in 
their neighbourhood (or at their workplace, or in a range of other formal に such as churches and 
trades unions に and informal organisations and settings) the more likely they were to be influenced 
by them and vote socialist too. 
 
Many have aﾗﾉﾉﾗ┘WS TｷﾐｪゲデWﾐげゲ W┝;ﾏヮﾉW ;ﾐS aﾗ┌ﾐS similar W┗ｷSWﾐIW デｴ;デ ┘ｴWヴW ; ヮ;ヴデ┞げゲ ゲ┌ヮヮﾗヴデ 
base was strong, in terms of ;ﾐ ;ヴW;げゲ Iﾉ;ゲゲ ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴWが aﾗヴ W┝;ﾏヮﾉWが it tended to attract above-
average levels of support, but where it was weak its vote was below-average; electorates were 
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spatially more polarised in their support for particular parties than they were in the social 
characteristics of the individual members. That this polarisation came about through personal 
influence was in most cases only inferred, however, because the evidence was obtained from 
aggregate data only: Cox (1971), for example, knew how many manual workers (ouvriers) there 
were in each district in a sample of Parisian arrondissements, and what percentage of the votes cast 
there were won by the Communist party, but could only infer that the larger Communist vote in the 
districts with most ouvriers resident there resulted from inter-personal influence に what Miller 
ふヱΓΑΑぶ ヴWaWヴヴWS デﾗ ;ゲ けヮWﾗヮﾉW ┘ｴﾗ デ;ﾉﾆ デﾗｪWデｴWヴ ┗ﾗデW デﾗｪWデｴWヴげく B┌デ デｴW aｷﾐSｷﾐｪs were consistent with 
Cﾗ┝げゲ ふヱΓヶΓ; see Johnston and Pattie, 2012) model of voting decisions in a spatial context. Individuals 
operate as nodes on social networks に receiving, processing and sending out information along their 
links. Many of those networks are ゲヮ;デｷ;ﾉﾉ┞ ヴWゲデヴｷIデWSが aﾗI┌ゲWS ﾗﾐ デｴW ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉゲげ ｴﾗﾏW 
neighbourhoods, so that if (some) people (at least) are influenced in their political opinions by those 
they interact with, then where the weight of information in an area favours one party over others 
participants in its social networks are more likely to vote for the majority party than their 
contemporaries who may have similar individual characteristics but live in areas where the party has 
much less support. 
 
Many p;デデWヴﾐゲ ﾗa ┗ﾗデｷﾐｪ IﾗﾐゲｷゲデWﾐデ ┘ｷデｴ デｴｷゲ けIﾗﾐデ;ｪｷﾗﾐ H┞ Iﾗﾐデ;Iデげ ﾏﾗSWﾉ have been identified, but 
researchers have realised that the evidence presented is usually circumstantial only, and that similar 
patterns could be the outcome of different processes: people favouring a particular party may 
choose to live in areas where it is already strong, for example, so that the observed neighbourhood 
effect is a result of self-selection rather th;ﾐ けIﾗﾐ┗Wヴゲｷﾗﾐ H┞ Iﾗﾐ┗Wヴゲ;デｷﾗﾐげ (Walks, 2004, 2006, 2007; 
Gimpel and Hui, 2015: デｴ;デ ;ヴｪ┌ﾏWﾐデ ｷゲ ;ﾉゲﾗ IWﾐデヴ;ﾉ デﾗ Bｷゲｴﾗヮ ;ﾐS C┌ﾏﾏｷﾐｪげゲが ヲヰヰΒが IﾗﾐデWﾐデｷﾗﾐ デｴ;デ 
the recent growing spatial polarisation of voting in the USA reflects selective migration に an 
argument strongly countered by, among others, Abrams and Fiorina, 2012; but see Johnston et al, 
2016). To counter that researchers have sought more convincing evidence that the processes are as 
assumed. This has invariably involved using data obtained from individuals, taking advantage of 
small and large social surveys that include data on conversations and behaviour. Work by, for 
example, Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995) and Mutz (2006) has provided convincing evidence of the 
けIﾗﾐデ;ｪｷﾗﾐ H┞ Iﾗﾐデ;Iデげ ﾏﾗSWﾉげゲ ┗Wヴ;Iｷデ┞が ;ﾐS ;ﾉデｴﾗ┌ｪｴ ﾐﾗデ ;ﾉﾉ ﾗa デｴW ;ヮヮﾉｷI;デｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa デｴｷゲ ;ヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴ 
have had locational data relating to the geography of the social networks involved (though see Pattie 
and Johnston, 2000), it has become increasingly clear that the socio-spatial polarisation of 
electorates is the norm. 
 
The tendency for people to align their party support with that of their conversation partners is at the 
heart of the classic neighbourhood effect, therefore, and research shows that people who talk 
together do, to a noticeable degree, vote together, as a result of conversion processes. However, 
this hardly ever results in complete unanimity within neighbourhoods or within conversation 
networks: dissent persists. In part, this is because conversation networks are rarely politically 
homogeneous: most people talk to supporters of several different parties and of none. And as a 
result, they are open to sometimes heterodox opinions. Not all conversations point in the same 
direction (Huckfeldt et al, 2004). In part, too, it is because some voices are more influential than 
others. People pay more attention to those they know well than to strangers, to those whose 
opinions and judgments they trust, and to those who they think have expertise on the subject than 
on those whose views and judgements they trust less (Huckfeldt, 2001; Huckfeldt et al, 2014). And, 
nNﾗデ ゲ┌ヴヮヴｷゲｷﾐｪﾉ┞が デｴW ゲデヴﾗﾐｪWヴ ;ﾐ ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉげゲ ﾗ┘ﾐ ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ ┗ｷW┘ゲ ;ﾐS ヮ;ヴデｷゲ;ﾐゲｴｷヮが デｴW ﾉWゲゲ ﾉｷﾆWﾉ┞ ｴW 
or she is to be influenced by divergent views coming from conversation partners (Cox, 1969; 
McClurg, 2006). Not all of the studies such as those discussed here have data on the geography of 
the conversation networks studied; those undertaken by Huckfeldt do, however, and a reworking of 
the data showed that most conversations took place between people living no more than three 




Of course, very few neighbourhoods are exclusive to one social class, and many social networks 
contain individuals who differ in their political persuasions. All networks and districts are open to 
external に and challenging に influences, therefore, and although continuity is the dominant pattern 
ｷﾐ ;ﾐ┞ ;ヴW;げゲ ┗ﾗデｷﾐｪ ﾗ┗Wヴ デｷﾏW Iｴ;ﾐｪW ｷゲ ヮﾗゲゲｷHle as a result of new information flows, perhaps 
introduced through what Granovetter (1973) termed weak ties (as illustrated in Huckfeldt et al., 
2004). Area populations change too, as people die and others move out, and their replacements may 
bring new ideas and affiliations. Those who move away from a neighbourhood where they spent 
their formative years may retain the attitudes learned there, however, as illustrated by Wrightげゲ 
(1977) study of voting for the American Independent Party (Southern populist and segregationist) 
candidate George Wallace in the 1968 US presidential election: the larger the black population of the 
area in which white voters lived, the more likely the latter were to vote for Wallace に but it was the 
level of black concentration where they lived in 1940, when many of those who voted for Wallace 
thirty years later were being politically, socially and culturally socialised, rather than where they 
lived in election year itself, that had the strongest impact on their political attitudes. (In this 
example, the smaller the white minority in an area the greater the cohesion around attitudes against 
the local black majority.) 
 
When change is slow, new residents in an area may be strongly influenced by the majority opinion 
there に especially if they are both open to persuasion and participate in neighbourhood activities. 
Many studies of political attitudes have found that while some people are strongly committed to 
one set of ideas and one party, and vote for it whatever challenging information they may 
encounter, others (and an increasing proportion of the population in many countries) are less 
committed thant their predecessors and open to considering alternative ideas and party manifestos.  
Research (e.g. Johnston et al., 2005) has found that those with strong levels of neighbourhood social 
capital were more likely to conform to local electoral behaviour patterns than those who were 
けゲヮ;デｷ;ﾉ ｷゲﾗﾉ;デWゲげ; joining local social networks encourages embracing local majority attitudes. 
 
Many studies of neighbourhood effects have, because of the nature of the available data, been 
constrained to analyses of its operation at one spatial scale only に basically, whatever data are 
available at a scale that seems to approximate that of the neighbourhoods within which (many) 
people interact. As more data have become available and as it has become possible to merge social 
surveys comprising data on individuals with census and other data on aggregate populations at a 
variety of scales, so more sophisticated modelling of neighbourhood effects に broadly defined に has 
become feasible. One scale largely omitted from most studies has been that of the individual 
household, yet this is the context within which most people are politically socialised. People who live 
together, and especially those who talk politics together at home, should show the effects of inter-
personal influence に a hypothesis confirmed by studies using data on all members of households: 
not only do they vote together but they also tend to change their partisan preferences together 
(Johnston et al., 2005b; Zuckerman et al., 2007). And not all research focuses on interactions within 
neighbourhoods: Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995), for example, looked at church congregations as 
local contexts, and Mutz and Mondak (2006) explored workplace contexts, both with the same 
results に people who worship together, vote together, as also do people who work together. 
 
The greater flexibility of modern datasets に many of which are now geocoded に has seen the 
ｷﾐデヴﾗS┌Iデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ┘ｴ;デ ;ヴW ﾆﾐﾗ┘ﾐ ;ゲ けHWゲヮﾗﾆW ﾐWｷｪｴHﾗ┌ヴｴﾗﾗSゲげ デﾗ ┗ﾗデｷﾐｪ ゲデ┌SｷWゲく IﾐゲデW;S ﾗa ヴWﾉ┞ｷﾐｪ on 
data at one scale only に such as the census tract に investigators have been able to compile data on 
the characteristics of either all individuals living within a prescribed distance of a survey 
ヴWゲヮﾗﾐSWﾐデげゲ ｴﾗﾏWが ﾗヴ ﾗﾐ デｴﾗゲW ﾗa デｴW ﾐW;ヴWゲデ ﾐ┌ﾏHWヴ ﾗa ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉゲ ふゲ;┞ ヲがヰヰヰぶ デﾗ デｴ;デ ;SSヴWゲゲく Aゲ 
many censuses now report data at very small spatial scales に with average populations of only a few 
hundred at most に it is possible to construct a spatial hierarchy of such bespoke neighbourhoods 
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ふゲ┌Iｴ ;ゲ ﾐWｷｪｴHﾗ┌ヴｴﾗﾗSゲ Iﾗﾏヮヴｷゲｷﾐｪ デｴW ﾐW;ヴWゲデ ヲヵヰ ヮWヴゲﾗﾐゲ デﾗ ; ゲ┌ヴ┗W┞ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐSWﾐデげゲ ｴﾗﾏWが ﾐWゲデWS 
within neighbourhoods with the nearest 1,000 persons, nested in those with the nearest 2,500, and 
ゲﾗ ﾗﾐぐぶく Tｴｷゲ Wﾐ;HﾉWゲ ;ﾐ W┗;ﾉ┌;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ;デ ┘ｴｷIｴ ゲI;ﾉWゲ ﾐWｷｪｴHﾗ┌ヴｴﾗﾗS WaaWIデゲ ;ヴW ﾏﾗゲデ ｷﾐデWﾐゲｷ┗Wく 
One early study, for example, found that in 1997 British working-class individuals were more likely to 
vote Labour the more working-class the Parliamentary constituency in which they lived; within those 
constituencies, they were more likely to vote Labour the more working-class the district in which 
they lived; and within those districts, the more working-class the immediate neighbourhood around 
their homes, the greater still the probability that they voted Labour (MacAllister at al., 2001). 
Investigations of such multi-scalar influences have been advanced by the adoption of multi-level 
modelling strategies (Jones et al., 1992). Their application in analyses of two British general elections 
showed significant variations in voting behaviour at two local scales (the immediate neighbourhood 
に  within 250 ﾏWデヴWゲ ﾗa デｴW ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉげゲ ｴﾗﾏW に and its wider locale に within 2000 metres) as well as 
between regions (Johnston et al., 2005c:; a similar set of findings wereas reported in a study of 
voting at Taiwanese elections: Weng, 2015; and Bisgaard et al., 2016, have shown that individual 
D;ﾐｷゲｴ ┗ﾗデWヴゲげ ヮWヴIWヮデｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa デｴW ゲデ;デW ﾗa デｴW ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞ were influenced most by the level of 
unemployment in their immediate neighbourhoods に as the area was enlarged the effect of local 
context on perceptions diminshed). 
 
Friends and neighbours voting 
 
In most elections voters are faced with a choice between rival political parties, even though the 
mark they make on the ballot paper may be against named candidates: most of the latter are 
supported not on the basis of their personal characteristics but rather because of the parties they 
ヴWヮヴWゲWﾐデく NW┗WヴデｴWﾉWゲゲが デｴWヴW ;ヴW ゲﾗﾏW ゲｷデ┌;デｷﾗﾐゲ ┘ｴWヴW デｴW ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉ I;ﾐSｷS;デWゲげ Iｴ;ヴ;IデWヴｷゲデｷIゲ 
are among the major IヴｷデWヴｷ; ｷﾐaﾉ┌WﾐIｷﾐｪ ┗ﾗデWヴゲげ SWIｷゲｷﾗﾐゲく 
 
TｴW Iﾉ;ゲゲｷI ゲデ┌S┞ ﾗa ゲ┌Iｴ ゲｷデ┌;デｷﾗﾐゲ ┘;ゲ Vく Oく KW┞げゲ ふヱΓ49) on Southern Politics in the USA. Many 
states there during the first half of the twentieth century were dominated by a single party and the 
main electoral contests were between candidates seeking its nomination for a local, state or national 
ﾗaaｷIWく KW┞げゲ W┝;mples showed that many performed better in the areas around their home than 
elsewhere within the territory being contested. He interpreted this as voters, in the absence of any 
other criteria on which to base their decisions, plumping for the local candidate (whom they may 
know), as a way of promoting local interests. This became known as friends-and-neighbours voting: 
people vote for local candidates because either they know them personally or know people who do 
に or they believe somebody with local links will best represent them in the relevant legislative body 
or office. Such personal knowledge is rarely extensive, however, especially in large territories, and 
voters depend on other cues to direct them to the characteristics of and likely benefits to accrue 
from support for local candidates に such as local media, as illustrated by Bowler et al. (1993) in a 
Californian study. Candidates who get に and may seek に high profiles in local media which cover part 
of the electoral territory only may well perform better there than in other parts of the territory as a 
consequence. 
 
Given the predominance of parties in most elections, friends and neighbours voting may be 
considered a minor element to the geography of voting behaviour, being characteristic of just those 
contests, many of them intra-party, where the choice set invites electors to deploy other criteria 
when determining which candidates to support に as illustrated by studies of city council elections in 
New Zealand (Johnston, 1973). Particular voting systems may encourage such behaviour. In both 
Australia and Ireland, for example, the single transferable vote system requires candidates to be 
rank-ﾗヴSWヴWSく WｴWヴW ; ┗ﾗデWヴ ｷゲ SWデWヴﾏｷﾐｷﾐｪ ┘ｴｷIｴ ﾗa ; ヮ;ヴデ┞げゲ I;ﾐSｷS;デWゲ デﾗ ヴ;ﾐﾆ aｷヴゲデが ; ﾉﾗI;ﾉ 
candidate に if there is one に may be preferred (Johnston, 1978; Parker, 1982). More importantly, as 
clearly illustrated by some Irish studies, in order to maximise the number of its representatives who 
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┘ｷﾐ WﾉWIデｷﾗﾐが ; ヮ;ヴデ┞げゲ I;ﾏヮ;ｷｪﾐｷﾐｪ ﾏ;┞ aﾗI┌ゲ ﾗﾐ SｷaaWヴWﾐデ I;ﾐSｷS;デWゲ ｷﾐ Sｷaferent parts of a multi-
member constituency (Gorecki and Marsh, 2012, 2014) 
 
The friends and neighbours effect was divided into three main components in a recent study of the 
2010 contests aﾗヴ デｴW ﾉW;SWヴゲｴｷヮ ﾗa デｴW UKげゲ L;Hﾗ┌ヴ P;ヴデ┞ 2010 (Johnston et al., 2016), in which one 
part of the electoral college involved voting by party members conducted in and reported for each 
ﾗa GヴW;デ Bヴｷデ;ｷﾐげゲ ヶンヲ Cﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌WﾐI┞ L;Hﾗ┌ヴ P;ヴデｷWゲ ふCLPゲぶく Vﾗデｷﾐｪ H┞ ヮ;ヴデ┞ ﾏWﾏHWヴゲ ｷﾐ each 
I;ﾐSｷS;デWげs home constituency was by people who almost certainly knew the candidate に they were 
local friends. Candidates were much less likely to be known personally to party members in adjacent 
constituencies, but the flow of information across constituency boundaries through social networks 
and via local media could promote their cause among neighbours. Finally, there was the potential 
influence of political friends in other constituencies. In order to contest the election, candidates had 
to be nominated by a number of their fellow MPs, and those who nominated a candidate may have 
influenced members of their own local parties to support the person they preferred. Analyses 
showed that all three were relevant; even though the contest was for the leadership of one of the 
Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴ┞げゲ ﾉ;ヴｪWゲデ ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ ヮ;ヴデｷes, and thus for a potential Prime Minister, these local effects were 
clearly discernible. For example, one candidate に Andy Burnham に averaged only 8.8 per cent of the 
ﾏWﾏHWヴゲげ first preference votes across all 632 CLPs: he got 69.1 per cent in his home constituency, 
an average of 34.1 per cent in the five adjacent constituencies, and 19.4 per cent across the 
remaining 68 constituencies in the northwest region where his constituency was located; he also 
averaged 20.9 per cent in the 33 constituencies whose MPs nominated him, and 25.0 per cent in the 
23 whose MP gave him their first preference vote. 
 
‘WIWﾐデ ┘ﾗヴﾆ ｴ;ゲ ;ﾉゲﾗ ｷSWﾐデｷaｷWS ┗ﾗデｷﾐｪ ヮ;デデWヴﾐゲ IﾗﾐゲｷゲデWﾐデ ┘ｷデｴ デｴW けaヴｷWﾐSゲ ;ﾐS ﾐWｷｪｴHﾗ┌ヴゲげ 
argument at British general and local elections. At the 2010 general election, for example, Arzheimer 
and Evans (2012: see also Gimpel et al., 2008, for similar findings in the United States) found that the 
Sｷゲデ;ﾐIW HWデ┘WWﾐ ゲ┌ヴ┗W┞ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐSWﾐデゲげ ｴﾗﾏW ;SSヴWゲゲWゲ ;ﾐS デｴﾗゲW ﾗa I;ﾐSｷS;デWゲ ｷﾐ デｴWｷヴ 
constituency was negatively related to their propensity to vote for those candidates (other 
influences being held constant); similar results emerged from their study of voting at local 
government elections (Arzheimer and Evans, 2014). B┌デ デｴW WaaWIデ SﾗWゲﾐげデ ;ﾉ┘;┞ゲ ┘ﾗヴﾆく “ﾗﾏW 
candidates for the American presidency choose vice-presidential running mates whom they hope 
can deliver substantial support from certain groups and/or areas: Devine and Kopko (2016), 
however, found no evidence of vice-presidential candidates making a significant difference to the 




Most election campaigns, especially those to national and regional legislatures and to leadership 
positions, focus on issues with a wide relevance across the electorate に those that large numbers of 
voters consider the most important (such as the economy and immigration) and on which the 
contestants are offering alternative perspectives and policies. Even so, many of these salient policy 
issues vary locally: an economy may be booming in some parts of the country but relatively 
depressed elsewhere; the housing market may be buoyant in some places but depressed not 
elsewhere. If those situations are important to the voters, their responses may well vary according 
to the local circumstances. Thus, for example, Johnston and Pattie (2001) found that in 1997 British 
voters decided whether to punish or reward the incumbent Conservative government on the basis of 
both their personal financial situations and the performance of their local economy rather than the 
national situation; indeed other research showed that some people voted altruistically, against the 
incumbent government because many of their neighbours were suffering economically, even though 
they themselves were not (Johnston et al., 2000). “ｷﾏｷﾉ;ヴﾉ┞が P;デデｷW Wデ ;ﾉく ふヱΓΓヵぶ aﾗ┌ﾐS デｴ;デ ┗ﾗデWヴゲげ 
likelihood to support the incumbent UK government at the 1992 general election was related to the 
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performance of the local housing market during its slump in the preceding years; where that slump 
was deepest voters, especially those who themselves experienced negative equity, were less likely 
デﾗ ┗ﾗデW aﾗヴ デｴW ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデげゲ I;ﾐSｷS;デWゲ (Pattie et al., 1995). 
 
As well as these spatial variations in the nature of some of the key elements in an election campaign, 
local issues may be more influential on some voters in a place than the general ones, and may be 
linked to the local candidate(s). Incumbents seeking re-election, for example, may be punished by 
the local electorate for their performance に as to a small extent with the UK expenses scandal a year 
before the 2010 general election に and their party performs less well there than anticipated as a 
consequence (Pattie and Johnston, 2014き aﾗヴ ; Iﾗﾏヮ;ヴ;HﾉW U“ けゲI;ﾐS;ﾉげ ┘ｴｷIｴ ｷﾐ┗ﾗﾉ┗WS CﾗﾐｪヴWゲゲﾏWﾐ 
writing cheques on overdrawn accounts, and suffering in the subsequent polls as a consequence, see 
Banducci and Karp, 1994; Williams, 1998). Others may be rewarded by local voters に as illustrated by 
the large American literature on pork barrel politics, with legislators who deliver benefits for their 
local community, such as a major infrastructure investment, getting electoral returns as a 
consequence (Ferejohn, 1974; Johnston, 1980). And legislators will sometimes reflect local issues 
when voting in Parliamentary divisions, even if it means opposing the party line and whips. In late 
2015, for example, UK Conservative MPs were whipped to abstain in the vote against a Labour 
amendment regarding changes in the tax credit regime, but twenty voted for that amendment, a 
number of them representing marginal constituencies where the proposed cuts could significantly 
impact uponreduce their majority.1 
 
An example of the impact of a specific issue affecting parts of an area only was voting for the Mayor 
of Christchurch, New Zealand in 1971. The two main candidates に one representing a relatively right-
wing group and the other a left-wing party に drew votes across the city largely reflecting the class 
composition of different neighbourhoods. The city was to host the Commonwealth Games in 1974. 
The right-wing candidate (and incumbent mayor) backed one of the proposed sites for the main 
stadium, and he performed better than expected at the polling booths close to that site; his 
opponent favoured an alternative site に and his performance around it was better than average 
(Johnston, 1976). In a different context, research in Colombia has shown that people who move 
from a state-controlled part of the country to an area where right-wing militias hold sway are more 
likely to support a right-┘ｷﾐｪ I;ﾐSｷS;デW aﾗヴ デｴW Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴ┞げゲ ヮヴWゲｷSWﾐI┞ ふG;ヴIｹ;-Sánchez, 2016). 
 
In many countries に especially those using plurality electoral systems with single-member 
constituencies に tackling local issues, whether personal to individual voters, relating to a local 
community within the territory, or concerning the area as a whole, is a major component of their 
ヴWヮヴWゲWﾐデ;デｷ┗Wゲげ ┘ﾗヴﾆﾉﾗ;S, and what their constituents expect (Campbell and Lovenduski, 2015). In 
the United Kingdom, for example, acting as a local caseworker and champion is seen as one of the 
MPsげ デ┘ﾗ ﾏ;ｷﾐ ヴﾗﾉWゲ ふ“ヮW;ﾆWヴげゲ CﾗﾐaWヴWﾐIW ﾗﾐ P;ヴﾉｷ;ﾏWﾐデ;ヴ┞ ‘WヮヴWゲWﾐデ;デｷﾗﾐが ヲヰヱヰき Mﾗヴヴｷゲが ヲヰヱヲぶ; 
they are expected to maintain an office and a home in their constituency and to be active in social, 
cultural and economic as well as political life there. This can bring electoral rewards: MPs perceived 
by the electorate as effective operators within and for their constituents can be rewarded by greater 
support when they seek re-election. British studies have shown that this benefit is especially 
conferred on new MPs seeking re-election for the first-time (Wood and Norton, 1992; Buttice and 
Milazzo, 2011; Curtice, Fisher and Ford, 2015). 
 






Commented [CP1]: M;┞HW HWデデWヴ デﾗ ゲ;┞ けヴWS┌IWげ ;ゲ 
けゲｷｪﾐｷaｷI;ﾐデﾉ┞ ｷﾏヮ;Iデげ Iﾗ┌ﾉS ;ﾉゲﾗ ｷﾏヮﾉ┞ ;ﾐ increased majority に 
in which case why not do as the government asked? 
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Some MPs are more assiduous at the constituency role than others, although in the UK a very large 
proportion now give it a great deal of attention, making regular and frequent visits to the area and 
holding regular surgeries there, as well as (through their staff) responding to an increasing number 
and range of requests for assistance (many of them by email). In addition, some parties are generally 
more assiduous than others in the local activities undertaken by their members, in local as well as 
national government. In Great Britain, for example, the Liberal Democrat party built its 
Parliamentary vote share (to over 20 per cent at the 1983-1987 and then the 2005-2010 general 
elections) on the foundations of local activism and local government performance (as illustrated for 
ﾗﾐW Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌WﾐI┞ ｷﾐ ; aﾗヴﾏWヴ ﾉW;SWヴげゲ ;┌デﾗHｷﾗｪヴ;ヮｴ┞ぎ AゲｴSﾗ┘ﾐが ヲヰヰ9; see also Dorling et al., 1998, 
and Cutts, 2006a, 2006b). The MPs elected on this foundation had strong local roots, therefore, 
which were reflected in their electoral support. At the 2015 general election, for example, the 
Liberal Democratげゲ ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ vote share fell to 8.1 per cent from 23.0 per cent five years earlier. The 
party was defending 57 seats; in the 46 being contested by an incumbent MP, its vote share fell by 
14.3 percentage points on average, whereas in the eleven where the incumbent had retired and was 
replaced by a new candidate the fall was much larger at an average of 21.8 points. A similar spatially-
structured campaign was the centrepiece of the electoral strategy developed by the United Kingdom 
Independence Party for the 2015 general election (Goodwin and Milazzo, 2015). 
 
Parties and candidates seeking votes: campaign and canvass effects 
 
The main actors in almost all elections are the parties and their candidates, who actively seek 
support from the voters. Many campaigns, especially at general elections, are dominated now by the 
print, radio and TV and, increasingly, electronic media and forms of communication: parties put out 
messages promoting themselves and their candidates (especially their leaders). Alongside that, their 
local organisations and candidates make direct contact with voters within their own electoral 
districts. 
 
Although the procedure varies from country to country (and sometime within countries) the main 
ｪﾗ;ﾉ ﾗa デｴW ﾉﾗI;ﾉ I;ﾏヮ;ｷｪﾐゲ ｷゲ デﾗ ｷSWﾐデｷa┞ デｴW ヮ;ヴデ┞げゲ ゲ┌ヮヮﾗヴデWヴゲ ;ﾐS デｴWﾐ Iﾗﾐデ;Iデ デｴWﾏ に personally 
at their home if possible に to encourage them to remain firm in their support, and to express that 
support by turning out to vote on election day. Over time, parties build up databases に annotated 
versions of the electoral register に of their supporters who will almost certainly vote for them, those 
who do not support and will not vote for them, and those who may support the party. These have to 
be regularly updated, because of population mobility and to ensure that people have not changed 
their predispositions. Thus in the months before an election is due parties に especially in marginal 
districts where a seat could be won or lost に canvass support through a variety of means, both 
personal contact (on the doorstep) and indirectly (through telephone calls and email contacts where 
numbers and/or addresses are known). To a considerable extent thWゲW けｪWデ ﾗ┌デ デｴW ┗ﾗデWげ strategies 
are not random exercises: parties concentrate their efforts where they are more likely to get 
substantial rewards に in neighbourhoods within districts where their supporters are concentrated 
which they identify using geodemographic classifications of small-scale census and other data. (sSee 
Cutts, 2006, on the activities of the Liberal Democrats in one English city, and GヴWWﾐ ;ﾐS GWヴHWヴげゲが 
2004, account of controlled experiments designed to test the efficacy of such campaigns, and 
B;ヴ┘Wﾉﾉげゲが ヲヰヱヶが SWデ;ｷﾉWS Sescription of his own campaigning in a marginal constituency; see also, 
however, the negative findings reported by Cantoni and Pons, 2016.), which they identify using 
geodemographic classifications of small-scale census and other data. Leaflets are distributed in those 
;ヴW;ゲ デﾗ Wﾐゲ┌ヴW ┗ﾗデWヴゲ ﾆﾐﾗ┘ ﾗa デｴW WﾉWIデｷﾗﾐが デｴW ヮ;ヴデ┞げゲ I;ﾐSｷS;デW デｴWヴW ;ﾐS ┘ｴ;デ ヮﾗﾉｷIｷWゲ ;ヴW HWｷﾐｪ 
promoted, and there are follow-up calls, particularly on polling day when get-out-the-vote tactics 
are deployed to check whether supporters have voted and, if not, encourage them to do so before 
polling closes. Increasingly, those local efforts are enhanced by direct contact with local voters from 
デｴW ヮ;ヴデ┞げゲ IWﾐデヴ;ﾉ ふﾗヴ ヴWｪｷﾗﾐ;ﾉぶ I;ﾏヮ;ｷｪﾐ ﾗヴｪ;ﾐｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐが ┌ゲ┌;ﾉﾉ┞ デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ ゲ┌Iｴ media channels as 
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bespoke letters, emails and postings on social media sites (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2015; Fisher, 
2015). But contact may not always be necessary; in one experiment, Green et al. (2016) showed that 
the density of posters on lawns in an area had an influence on the advertised candidatesげ ゲ┌IIWゲゲく 
 
These campaigns have become increasingly sophisticated, as have the techniques deployed to 
explore their extent and efficacy. In the UK, for example, early studies had to use surrogate data for 
; I;ﾏヮ;ｷｪﾐげゲ ｷﾐデWﾐゲｷデ┞ に such as the amount that candidates report having spent on their campaigns 
(relative to the legally-imposed limits), the number of members and activists working in the 
constituency, and a range of other measures of campaign intensity (for an overview of much of this 
work, see Johnston and Pattie, 2014). All reach the same conclusion: the more intensive a local 
partyげゲ I;ﾏヮ;ｷｪﾐが ｴﾗ┘W┗Wヴ ﾏW;ゲ┌ヴWSが デｴW HWデデWヴ ｷデゲ I;ﾐSｷS;デWげゲ ヮWヴaﾗヴﾏ;ﾐIWく B┌デ デｴWゲW ヮヴﾗ┗ｷSW 
circumstantial evidence only. The development of internet panel surveys has allowed more direct 
evidence to be elucidated. For example, the 2011 Welsh Election Study asked respondents whether 
they had been contacted by one or more of the parties during the campaign. Among them, 236 had 
voted Conservative at the previous National Assembly election in 2007; 181 of these had no contact 
from the party during the campaign, and 78.5 per cent of them voted Conservative again. Of the 
remainder, of those whose only contact was to receive a leaflet, 83.3 per cent voted Conservative, 
whereas among those contacted personally by the party に by a home visit, for example に 93.3 per 
cent voted Conservative. Of Liberal Democrat voters in 2007, only 36.4 per cent of those not 
contacted during the campaign supported the party again in 2011, whereas 71.4 per cent of those 
contacted did so; those ignored by the party in 2011 were more likely to defect to another.  Even 
among those who supported a party in the past, therefore, those who were personally asked to 
again were more likely to do so; those not contacted were more likely to change their mind and vote 
for another に especially if it did contact them (Johnston et al., 2016). 
 
Although panel survey data provide much better insight into the impact of local campaigns they are 
not without problems: a party is more likely to contact its known supporters in the last weeks before 
an election, for example, and they are more likely to vote for it に for them, contact during the 
campaign may have little effect as they are already committed to it. Methods have been developed 
to circumvent this potential problem (the technical term is endogeneity) and confirm that campaign 
contact has an independent impact (Pattie et al., 2015). Parties and candidates expend much more 
effort in some places than others in seeking votes に they spend more money on leaflets and posters, 
they contact more voters in their homes and on the streets, and they visit more of their known 
supporters on polling day itself to ensure that they vote. And it works: the more active a party is 




The much-quoted adage, generally associated with former US House of Representatives Speaker Tip 
OげNWｷﾉﾉが デｴ;デ け;ﾉﾉ ヮﾗﾉｷデｷIゲ ｷゲ ﾉﾗI;ﾉげ ﾏ;┞ HW hyperbole: people vote in a particular way for a variety of 
reasons, some, if not many, of which may have little to do with their local context. But voters, all 
other things being equal (which, of course, they very rarely are), prefer local candidates (Campbell 
and Cowley, 2014; Childs and Cowley, 2011), especially local candidates who know their 
constituency, itげs residents and their concerns and represent those concerns, even if it means acting 
;ｪ;ｷﾐゲデ デｴWｷヴ ヮ;ヴデ┞げゲ ┘ｷSWヴ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデゲく P;ヴデｷWゲ ;ヴWが ﾗa Iﾗ┌ヴゲWが ;┘;ヴW ﾗa デｴｷゲが ﾗa ｴﾗ┘ ｷﾐaﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐ ;Hﾗ┌デ 
candidates flows through local social networks and influences their behaviour and they act 
accordingly when seeking support. Election results thus reflect a continuing interplay between the 
parties and candidates, on the one hand, and the local context, on the other; as studies of an 
increasing number of countries demonstrate (Guigal et al., 2011; Weng, 2015; Amara and El Lagha, 
2016), geography is a fundamental component of many aspects of elections, their conduct and their 
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outcomes. All politics may not be local: but where it is locally oriented, there are substantial rewards 
to be won. 
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